This article presents a quantitative assessment of Catholic disaffiliates -i.e., those who were brought up Catholic, but who now no longer identify as such -in contemporary Britain. Using British Social Attitudes data, it seeks to i) gauge the overall extent of Catholic disaffiliation, and its significance relative to the retention/disaffiliation rates of other major Christian groupings; ii) identify patterns in the changing rates of Catholic retention/disaffiliation over the course of the twentieth century; iii) analyses Catholic disaffiliation in terms of key demographic variables (sex and age); and iv) compares the current religious beliefs and prayer practices of different groups of Catholic disaffiliates and retainees. As will be argued throughout this article, in-depth study of Catholic disaffiliates sheds important new light on the sociology of Catholicism in modern Britain. Furthermore, it contributes to ongoing discussions of secularization, precisely as a case-study of change over time within a significant religious minority.
Introduction
This article presents a quantitative assessment of Catholic disaffiliates -i.e., those who were brought up Catholic, but who now no longer identify as such -in contemporary Britain. This description applies to two in five of all those raised Catholic, according to pooled 2007-11 data from the British Social Attitudes survey. The purpose of the present study is to map the main contours of the phenomenon. It will do this in four main ways. i) By gauging the overall extent of Catholic disaffiliation, and its significance relative to the retention/disaffiliation rates of other major Christian groupings. ii) By identifying patterns in the changing rates of Catholic retention/disaffiliation over the course of the twentieth century (principally using decadal birth cohorts), as a contribution to wider debates concerning the dating and timing of secularization. iii) By beginning the task of analysing Catholic disaffiliation in terms of key demographic variables (in this case, sex and age i ), as a prelude to future quantitative and qualitative research looking at the causes of, and influences upon, disaffiliation. And iv) by comparing the current religious beliefs and prayer practices of different groups of Catholic disaffiliates and retainees. As will be argued throughout this article, in-depth study of Catholic disaffiliates sheds important new light on the sociology of Catholicism in modern Britain. Furthermore, it contributes to ongoing discussions of secularization, precisely as a case-study of change over time within a significant religious minority -and one in which, as numerous studies have noted, 'tribal' feelings of belonging have traditionally been strong (see Hornsby-Smith).
Religious affiliation, and its steadily increasing unpopularity over the last fifty or sixty years, is among the primary indicators of British secularization (alongside falling patterns of religious belief and religious practice). According to the 2011 British Social Attitudes survey, slightly over 50% of Britons now claim to have 'no religion'. Two-thirds of these were, however, brought up within a religious -and in the vast majority of cases, Christian -tradition. This traffic is, moreover, almost all one way: only one in every fifty people brought up without a religious affiliation now identify as having one. Accordingly, the driving force of secularization in Britain (and presumably elsewhere) is chiefly to be found in the phenomenon variously described in recent literature as 'disaffiliation', 'deconversion', ornow less common -'apostasy' (see Cragun and Hammer) .
Especially when compared to religious conversion, the dynamics of deconversion or disaffiliation have received little sociological attention. Notable exceptions here, however, are several qualitative studies of disaffiliates (e.g., Francis and Richter; Zuckerman) , andmost germane to the present study -recent quantitative work disentangling period and cohort effects, and gauging the influence of parental religiosity on intergenerational religious transmission (Crockett and Voas; Bruce and Glendinning ; Schwadel; Voas and Storm) . Also relevant is the growing body of research, both qualitative and quantitative, which directly focuses on the self-ascribing nonreligious, especially in Britain and USA (Kosmin et al.; Voas and McAndrew; Lee) . Whereas earlier scholarship tended to dismiss none, no religion, and nonreligious as merely residual 'catch all' labels, artificially created by survey researchers (see Vernon; Hout and Fischer; Pasquale) , newer studies have emphasized that these are often meaningful self-descriptions which are adopted 'proactively' (Lee; see also Bullivant, 'Indifferent'). Also noteworthy is the evidence from American datasets that the nones constitute a fluid and heterogeneous population, comprising multiple subgroups. Plausibly, at least some of this diversity may be ascribed to the differing religious backgrounds towards which many nones still retain at least some attachment (see Baker and Smith; Lim et al.) .
Thus in a new twist to the old joke about Northern Irish atheists, it seems that it might make sense, in generalized demographic and attitudinal terms, to speak of '(formerly) Jewish Significantly, the 2007-11 dataset includes the more detailed religion-related items administered to a subset of respondents in the 2008 wave (these form the basis of the below analysis of religious beliefs and prayer practices). In order to measure historical rates of retention and disaffiliation over time, however, data were used from twenty waves (1991-2011, excluding 1992) . This is because the relevant question regarding upbringing was only asked from 1991 onwards.
Results and discussion
Contemporary Catholic disaffiliation in context
[ Table I here] However, the data clearly show that, within the general trend of high levels of Christian disaffiliation, there is a marked degree of denominational variation. On this measure at least, 'Anglican secularization' has a noticeably different texture to 'Catholic secularization', and both differ markedly from Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, or 'nondenominational' varieties.
At 62%, the Catholic Church's retention rate is the strongest of the main British denominations. Nearly three out of every five cradle Catholics retain their affiliation, compared to roughly one in two of those raised Anglican, Presbyterian, or 'non-denom', and only one in three raised Baptist or Methodist. This fact alone might justify a more detailed investigation of Catholic retention: why is Catholic identity transmitted more reliably than that of any other British denomination? While the bulk of that subject is outside the proper scope of the present study, a more detailed, decade-by-decade breakdown of Catholic retention will be presented and discussed in the following section.
It would, however, almost certainly be a mistake to dwell exclusively on the relative strength of Catholic retention. After all, a retention rate of 62% equals a disaffiliation rate of 38%. Furthermore, we will later see that a large proportion of those who do retain a Catholic identity rarely or never practise their faith, and that a significant minority are atheists or agnostics. The Catholic birthrate would need to be vastly higher than the national averagewhich it is not -to approach the rate of replacement. The slight decline in the proportion of Catholics within the British population over the last quarter-century (10.5% in the pooled 1983-7 BSA dataset; 9.0% in 2007-11) would, therefore, be much larger if not for immigration.
Especially in England, the idea of the 'Catholic convert' holds a strong resonance Table I shows that conversions to Catholicism are dwarfed, by a ratio of one to ten, by disaffiliations away from it (either to another religious tradition, or -in most cases -to no religion). This ratio is about equal to that found in the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches.
[ Table II here]
A breakdown of conversion rates among the major Christian groups is given in Table   II , with 'No religion' again included for comparison. Once again, there are striking denominational differences: less than 1 in 10 Catholics, Anglicans, or Presbyterians are converts, compared to 2 in 10 Methodists, and over 3 in 10 Baptists or non-denoms. Notably, former nones compose only around 1% to 6% of any denomination's current affiliates, and no
Christian group attracts more than a handful of those brought up in non-Christian religions.
That is to say, the overwhelming majority of converts to a given Christian group are already brought up within a (different) Christian group. The Catholic Church is a case in point. While 7.2% of currently affiliating Catholics in the 2007-11 data are converts, only 1 in 10 of these (i.e., 0.8% of all Catholics) were brought up as nones, and not a single one was raised in a non-Christian religion. It is perhaps worth noting that, theoretically, it is possible for every Christian group to report high rates of conversion (due to a significant minority switching between denominations), while overall Christian numbers continue to decline (due to large numbers of born-and-raised Christians becoming nones, and only small numbers of people converting from a non-Christian background). Feasibly, this kind of model would allow localized instances of 'church growth' (see Goodhew) to be comprehended within, and not as a challenge to, the secularization paradigm.
Catholic disaffiliation through the decades
[ Table III here] proportion of born-and-raised Catholics adopting another religious affiliation has remained relatively steady throughout the whole period (mean = 5.9%; standard deviation = 0.9). As such, the falling retention rate is due overwhelmingly to the growing popularity of 'no McLeod, incorporating Brown's and others' arguments into a more wide-ranging analysis, contends that the religious ferment of the late-sixties 'may come to be seen as marking a rupture as profound as that brought by the Reformation' (1). Recently, Steve Bruce has challenged this kind of approach, arguing that the Baby Boomers' low levels of religiosity compared to previous generations are due instead to their parents' (and especially their mothers') experiences during World War Two: it is not that they became less religious in the sixties, but that they had been brought up less religiously in the forties and fifties (Secularization; see also Bruce and Glendinning).
As it stands, the data here offer no adjudication on these matters: they simply add McLeod (the latter especially gives them considerable attention), and there is a growing body of literature recounting both the hopes and anxieties with which they were met on the ground in Britain and elsewhere (e.g., Massa; Harris; Corrin; McDannell) . Vatican II has been described as the 'biggest meeting in the history of the world' (O'Malley 10), and given the extent of its liturgical, pastoral, and doctrinal reforms, it seems unlikely that it would have no effect whatsoever on the retention (or not) of those Catholics who came of age either during or after it. Even if the relatively high level of disaffiliation within the 1945-54 cohort had already largely been 'set' by earlier (perhaps parental) factors, one might expect subsequent birth cohorts, brought up wholly or in part in the postconciliar Catholic world, to have been affected in some significant way. This too, however, cannot be established from the present data.
Sex and Age
[ Table IV here]
To aid the analysis in this and the following sections, the contemporary sample (i.e., all those giving Catholic as their religion of upbringing in the pooled 2007-11 dataset) has been divided into four categories, on the assumption that these represent distinctive subgroups. (Please see Table IV .) Most obviously, the disaffiliates have been divided into 'Leavers' (i.e., those who now claim no religious affiliation) and 'Switchers' (i.e., those who have adopted a non-Catholic religious identification). Due to the small percentages involvedsee Table I -the Switchers category combines both members of (non-Catholic) Christian denominations and non-Christian religions. Meanwhile, those retaining their Catholic affiliation have been divided by frequency of religious practice: 'Regular practisers' who attend church once a month or more, and 'Low/non-practisers' who attend less than monthly.
This division, which splits the Catholic retainees more or less in half (see Table IV religious identity, meaning that women are almost twice as likely to do so. The greatest divergence between the sexes thus occurs in the 'no religion' category, which accounts for two-fifths of all men, but a quarter of all women (see Chart II).
[Chart II here]
Thirdly, among those who have retained a Catholic identity, regular practice is markedly more prevalent among women. As is displayed in Chart II, just under a third of born-and-raised Catholic women attend church monthly or more, compared to around a fifth of men. This effect, amplified by the fact that more women identify as having been raised Catholic in the first place, can be most clearly seen in Table V : over two-thirds of Regular practisers are female. This disparity is much less evident among the Low/non-practisers, who account for roughly a third of men and women alike.
[Chart III here]
Chart III breaks down our four categories by age group. As one would expect from the earlier cohort analysis (see Chart I), disaffiliates are most prevalent among respondents in their forties (with corresponding birth years from the late 1950s to the early 1970s).
Interestingly, we see that the proportions of Low/non-practisers are fairly consistently across this and all older age groups (all within a couple of percent in the low 30s). The real differences come in the proportion of Regular practisers: 37.3% of the over 70s, 34% of the 60-69s, 28.1% of 50-59s, and just 23.3% of the 40-49s. This lower proportion then holds fairly consistently among the 30-39s (24.7%) and the under 30s (23.8%). The recovery in Catholic retention evident among the younger age groups -also noted in the above cohort analysis -is thus almost wholly composed of higher numbers of Low/non-practisers.
It is of course possible that this 'recovery' is only apparent, and is the result of the under-40s cohorts not yet having had time to reach their full 'disaffiliation potential'. Based on previous studies, one might reasonably expect a sizable number of those surveyed in their late-teens and early twenties to become Leavers or Switchers at a later time (see Center for
Applied Research in the Apostolate 6-7). That said, previous British research offers strong arguments against the existence of notable age or period effects on religious identification, at least among the over-30s. Crockett and Voas' much-cited analysis of both British Household Panel Survey and BSA data, for instance, found 'an absence of any period or age effects over and above the generational differences' (571; cf. Schwadel for an analysis of US data).
Irrespective of the permanence of the effect, it is worth underlining the fact that it is not those in their late-teens, 20s and 30s, but is instead those in and around their 40s, who are most alienated, in terms of both affiliation and practice, from their cradle Catholicism. This finding runs counter to a great deal of received wisdom within Catholic pastoral circles.
Religious beliefs and prayer
The wisdom of dividing Catholic disaffiliates into two separate groups, however cumbersome in other respects, becomes clear as we turn now to religious beliefs and opinions, and frequency of prayer. Those who leave Catholicism in order to join another denomination or religious tradition are a distinct type of disaffiliate from those who now claim no religious affiliation whatsoever. As we shall see, in this area, Switchers have more in common with Regular practisers than they do with either Leavers or Low/non-practisers.
[ Table VI here] Unsurprisingly, Leavers score relatively low on God belief, with over half giving a fairly straightforwardly atheistic ('don't believe in God') or agnostic ('don't know') response (although note that almost one-fifth of Low/non-practisers did likewise). Nevertheless, over a fifth of Leavers affirm one of the two strongest theistic categories. This is not necessarily surprising since, as sociologists have been pointing out for almost fifty years, being religiously unaffiliated is not the same thing as being an atheist or agnostic (e.g., Vernon;
Bullivant, 'Sociology'; Kosmin et al.) . However on this point, former Catholic nones differ from British nones-in-general -only around 10% of whom either 'know God really exists' or 'feel that [they] do believe in God'.
Almost three quarters of Switchers affirmed one of the two strongest theistic categories -a proportion closer to the Regular practisers' four-fifths than it is to the Low/nonpractisers' half. Also like the Regulars, none of the Switchers claimed not to believe in God, and only around one in twenty expressed agnosticism (again, much nearer to the Regulars' none, than to the Low/non-practisers' one in five). Switchers do differ from Regular practisers, however, in the proportion of those affirming a 'Higher power of some kind' but not a 'personal God': 13.6% compared to the Regulars' 3.6%, a proportion much closer to both the Low/non-practisers (10.8%) and the Leavers (16.3%).
[ Table VII here] showing the proportion of each category who affirmed them (regardless of the 'strength' of affirmation). It is not necessary to discuss each item in detail, but similar patterns to the ones identified above emerged here also. That is to say, Leavers are not uniformly atheists or metaphysical naturalists: over two-fifths affirm some manner of life after death, almost a third believe in a heaven, and just under a fifth believe in hell, religious miracles, and that
God is personally concerned with every human being. Likewise, Switchers appear largely to have done so from religious conviction: as a group, they are notably more affirming of fairly classic Christian ideas than are Low/non-practising Catholics, and -albeit with some notable variation -tend to be nearer to the Regular practisers (e.g., regarding life after death, miracles, God's concern for humans, and life being meaningful only if God exists).
[ Table VIII here]
Prayer frequency (see Table VIII ) is an especially interesting measure, since it captures practice -time spent actually doing something -instead of simply gauging opinions, which may or may not have any significance in the lives of respondents. As expected, Leavers tend to pray little, with two-thirds never doing it. Even so, slightly over one in ten prays on a monthly or more basis. Arguably the most prayerful group, at least in terms of praying once a week or more, are the Switchers, two-thirds of whom fit this category, slightly ahead of Regular practisers (albeit based on a relatively small sample size). This is over three times the proportion of Low/non-practisers who do so. Again, the implication is clear: those who disaffiliate in order to adopt another religious identity do not typically seem to do so out of indifference, or by default.
Conclusion
The above analysis is intended to shed initial light on arguably the single most To strike the traditional final note of exploratory articles such as these: there is a great deal more work to be done in this area. Hitherto much of the research into the waning of religious belief, practice, and affiliation has focused either on the very large, macro level (e.g., broad societal trends, typically collapsing 'mainline denominations' into a single graph line), or on the very small, micro (e.g., individual deconversion narratives, or the psychological characteristics of religious deconverts). While both are important and necessary, largely missing has been sustained sociological attention on how both play out, concretely, within the specific histories of individual religious denominations and communities. The data presented above -not least the notable differences in disaffiliation and conversion rates among the denominations -make a prima facie case for exploring further how largescale secularizing trends have been (and are being) mediated differently within different British Christian groupings. Accordingly, the bulk of this paper is intended as a first step towards doing just that for one of them.
'inactive', or even 'resting' have been suggested as replacements, though none has yet been widely adopted.
Since lapsation is the traditional phraseology within the sociology of religion, I retain it here with the disclaimer that no pejorative sense is intended.
iii For interesting but irrelevant reasons, the Catholic Church in Britain is divided administratively between 'England and Wales' and 'Scotland' (Northern Ireland, meanwhile, comes under 'Ireland') . The data presented in this paper, however, relate to Britain as a whole. iv 'Denomination' is used here in a non-technical sense, as a short-hand for as a common, generic grouping of Christians (e.g., Roman Catholic, Church of England/Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, etc.). Obviously, the inclusion of 'Christian -no denomination' as a denomination even in this sense is problematic. This is especially so since those selecting this category likely include representatives from a very large and varied collection of Christian groups. However, given the significant size of the grouping (it was the third most popular affiliation in the BSA 2007-11 data, after 'No religion' and 'Church of England/Anglican'), along with US research suggesting that 'non-denom' is often a meaningful self-description, it is included here as a category in its own right. v Due to the precise wording of the BSA question ('Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?') we may assume here that the practising Leavers are attending Catholic services, while the Switchers are attending meetings or services connected with their new denomination/religion. 
